Essay War Against Terrorism

Just. War. Theory. Just. War. Theory.

IN WATCHING the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something very fundamental has happened in world history.

It is owned and maintained by Mark Rigstad, Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Oakland University (a . WARS: War in Iraq. War with Iran? War in Afghanistan. War in Libya. MORE PAGES: Book Reviews (updated 1.

The United States would make destroying Iran’s major nuclear facilities its primary aim, and it would likely be successful within hours of a conflict breaking out. Articles On The Tell Tale Heart. The Psychology of Terrorism Clark R. McCauley, Professor of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College. Terrorism as a Category of Violence. Get the latest international news and world events from Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and more. See world news photos and videos at ABCNews.com.

The Genocidal Left’s War Against Germany. By Paul Weston “Would it not be easier In that case for the government To dissolve the people And elect another?”. Definition of Terrorism – Social and Political Effects. By Gregor Bruce In Review Article Issue Volume 21 No. Social structure and order. Essaymania.com provides a searchable database of over one hundred thousand prewritten essays, term papers, research papers for school, college papers, book reports. The Threat Is Already Inside. And nine other truths about terrorism that nobody wants to hear. By Rosa Brooks Rosa Brooks is a law professor at Georgetown University. The Case Against Qatar. The tiny, gas-rich emirate has pumped tens of millions of dollars through obscure funding networks to hard-line Syrian rebels and extremist. Where is the clear distinction between national wars and religious ones? Attacks against civilians vs. Attacks by people of the same religion against. Unfortunately defining terrorism is just as hard as understanding it. Although there is not a universally accepted definition of terrorism, most explanations.

Secondary Studies. Allies. JWT- shirts. Editorial Policy. JWT Blog: 8/5/2. 01. Sherman on survivor guilt; 8/5/2. Hugh Gallagher Essay on this page. U. S. Military spending and the budget deal; 8/3/2. CIA releases its Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation .

Unfamiliar with the basic terms of analysis and debate? Then check out the BBC's introduction to the ethics of warfare, or (for more detailed introductions) read Brian Orend's excellent introduction to the topic of . Contrary to facile accusations of absurdity, the idea of fighting for peace actually does make sense in theory. There is no more contradiction in waging war to keep warfare in check than there is in fighting fire with fire (which firefighters do all the time). Unfortunately, however, what makes sense in theory too often fails in practice. World War I was touted in the U. S. Armed human conflicts turn out to be more complex, varied and difficult to control than something as relatively simple and predictable as fire.

Moreover, as Barbara Ehrenreich explains in her essay on . Just and peace- promoting war efforts are exceedingly rare in human history. This is the reason why nearly every major figure in the just war tradition, from Augustine and Aquinas to Grotius and Walzer, has argued that warfare is only ever justified as a LAST RESORT. In many academic enumerations of the principles of just war theory, the principle of last resort shows up at the end of the list. It is, however, the FIRST PRINCIPLE of just war theory, because the ultimate justifying aim of the resort to arms is the protection of innocent lives and this aim is usually best pursued by peaceful means. The importance of the principle of last resort is not entirely uncontroversial, however. Temes, for one, argues that the experiences of the 2.

WWII and the war in former Yugoslavia, should lead us to abandon the principle of last resort. Just war theory is typically considered to be an essential rights- based or deontological theory. Yet, as we have defined it here - - as the attempt to distinguish between ethical justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces - - one might take a utilitarian approach to just war theory instead. Consider, for example, Jeremy Bentham's treatment of war. Among more recent works,Realpolitik: From the perspective of realpolitik, or .

The point of wisdom in warfare is to be on the right side of the political line separating the winners from the losers, not the moral line distinguishing the just from the unjust. Hence, the practical and philosophical quandaries of warfare concern the best strategies for achieving victory and avoiding defeat. It suggests that in reality warfare is not shaped or guided by ethical considerations, which is obviously empirically false. Essay Questions About Dna. The fact that many just war theorists (e. Judge Advocates) are embedded within the U. S. If realpolitik without awareness of the influence of just war theory is insufficiently realistic, just war theory without an adequate appreciation of realpolitik is at risk of becoming excessively idealistic.

Philosophically, just war theory is commonly understood to represent a middle way between, on the one hand, realpolitik's narrow focus on strategies of pure national self- interest, and, on the other hand, absolute pacifism's sometimes impracticable idealism. A just war is one fought for the sake of the pacifist's idealistic goal: lasting peace and justice.

Yet, to achieve this goal, the just war theorist must be realistically concerned with achieving victory and avoiding defeat. Moreover, speedy victories often come with humanitarian gains. For these and other reasons, just war theorists should study classic works of realpolick for their many strategic insights; and they should think about how to integrate, prioritize and balance considerations of justice and humanity with considerations of pure power politics. For an introductory overview, see W. Julian Korab- Karpowicz's article on . The Athenian side of the .

Sun Tzu's reflections on The Art of War is a widely recognized ancient Chinese masterpiece of strategic realism. Strategemata (8. 4- 9. AD) by Sextus Julius Frontinus and De Re Militari (3.

Flavius Vegetius Renatus, are examples from late Roman antiquity, highly influential in the middle ages and during the renaissance. Among other parts, chapter XIII of Leviathan (1. Thomas Hobbes's philosophical repudiation of Grotius's attempt to distinguish between just and unjust wars. Niccolo Machiavelli's The Art of War (1. Cause And Effect Essay About Pollution In Hindi here.

Napoleon Boneparte's Maxims of War (1. Carl von Clauswitz's treatise On War (1. Baron de Jomini's Art of War (1. European classics of realpolitik thinking about armed conflict. The now canonical 2.

Ernesto Che Guevara's Guerilla Warfare. Pacifism: If, as just war theorists maintain, the use of arms is justifiable only as a last resort for the resolution of conflicts, then it is incumbent upon anyone who would propose a just war already to have studied, and to have exhaustively considered or pursued, the full range of non- violent alternatives.

Although the ancient Chinese philosopher Mo Tzu directed his ethical criticisms only against . In The Laws of War and Peace, Grotius was responding in part to Desiderius Erasmus' In Praise of Folly, which presented an impassioned and influential statement of Renaissance Catholic pacifism. Etienne de la Boetie's Of Voluntary Servitude (pdf) (1. For other writings that suggest the power and the promise of peaceful social change, turn to Leo Tolstoy's The Kingdom of God is Within You (1. Look here for the growing number of available online secondary studies of some of the above classic works in the philosophy of peace & war. Crawford offers an insightful evaluation and critique of America's new .

Timothy Mitchell challenges Barber's account in . Or, as Rob Elder argues, are rations more effective than bombs against such an enemy? If so, then look no further than John Yoo's .

Yoo argues that in an age of global terrorism and rogue nations, a . How convenient for the hegemon (or would- be hegemon). If this theory were sound, we would find confirming evidence in how stable, secure and happy U. S. Yet, most of the international community is opposed to the kind of American exceptionalism that Bush has embraced and that Yoo defends. Yoo could attempt to address this objection by arguing that dissenting peoples and states (uninformed as they are by his theory) are failing to recognize their . This rejoinder would be essentially a priori and therefore ultimately unconvincing in any sort of reasonable international dialogue. But at least it would lay bare the essential logic of imperialism: Q: Who is the best judge of your interests?

A: The hegemon is, that's who, because it is more powerful than you are. See also his Dialectics of War: An Essay in the Social Theory of Total War and Peace. Sykes defend the Bush administration's post- 9/1.

The potential proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and state sponsors of terrorism provides a rationale for invading dangerous states sooner rather than later. Allowing every state to justify aggression in this manner is a clear recipe for anarchy.

It would substitute name- calling and unilateral aggression for the rule of international law. Within any legitimate legal order, there are no criminal persons or states, but only criminal acts. There is no such thing as a rogue nation. There are only roguish acts, such as the promotion of terrorist activities and the unprovoked and harmful invasion of another state.

National Security Maximalism calls for a great deal of deference to the President, above all because of his authority as Commander- in- Chief of the Armed Forces. Liberty Maximalism asks courts to assume the same liberty- protecting posture in times of war as in times of peace. Minimalism asks courts to follow three precepts: the President needs clear congressional authorization for intruding on interests having a strong claim to constitutional protection; fair hearings should generally be provided to those who have been deprived of their freedom; and courts should discipline their own authority through narrow, incompletely theorized rulings.

Of the three positions, Liberty Maximalism is the easiest to dismiss; courts will not and should not adopt it. National Security Maximalism is far more plausible, but it is in grave tension with the constitutional structure, and it is built on excessive optimism about the incentives of the President.

The most appealing approach is minimalism, which does remarkably well in capturing prominent decisions of the Supreme Court in World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the war on terrorism. Perhaps most importantly, his argument does not adequately address the changing character of . It makes no sense to allow the historically limited wartime provisions of the past to set the constitutional standard for a condition of counter- terrorism which lacks conceivable historical limits.

Sunstein also does not adequately defend the assumption that counter- terrorism ought to proceed by more or less conventional methods of warfare (invasion & occupation) rather than by new, multi- lateral, and at most quasi- military methods of international law enforcement (international forces targeting responsible parties for ICC prosecution). Consequently, he too easily dismisses the appropriateness of a principled juridical protection of civil liberties in present- day U. S. Moreover, his Liberty Maximalist is a straw judge. John Parachini's introductory talk is a catalogue of good advice not taken.

He emphasizes diplomacy, international law enforcement and prevention, rather than knee- jerk military action.

Foreign Policy Since World War IIAmerica has a split personality when it comes to foreign policy. On one side we are pragmatic. If one method does not work, we try another until we believe the problem is solved. Our pragmatic or realist side teaches us to respond to the facts of the situation and apply a rational decision- making process to problems. Its logic tells us that in order to be successful we must, at a minimum, balance our resources and capabilities with our objectives and liabilities. The other side of our personality grows out of the mythology of American exceptionalism – that shining beacon for the rest of the world to see, the New World. It is this Wilsonian idealism that leads us to believe that we can and should remake the world in our image.

We become missionaries. This split personality of realism and idealism has historically manifested itself in our foreign policy. The idealistic side of our character gets the United States into trouble. We lose sight of the facts that our resources are always limited and that these resources; measured not only in terms of economic, financial, and military means, but also political will, must at least match our objectives if we are to be successful.

This logic was the thrust of the insightful criticism of our containment strategy by journalist Walter Lippman in 1. Lippman focused on the problem of the mismatch between the goals of containment and the resources required to meet those goals. The missionary instinct causes us either to fail to prioritize our goals or to define them so broadly that we can never have enough resources to achieve them.

We become blind to the reality that our resources will rarely ever match these idealistic goals. When the Lippman gap, the deficit between our resources and goals, reaches a critical point, reality or the recognition of our own limited resources either forces or allows the pragmatic side of our character to redeem us. In other words, the redemptive qualities of reality save us from the sins of our missionary instinct. It has happened three times since the Korean War and if history is a guide, it will rescue us a fourth time from the crusade of America’s current foreign policy. The noted Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis has argued that the history of our containment policy toward the Soviet Union reflected the swing of a pendulum between periods when our resources did not match our ever- expanding goals and periods that required us to react to this deficit by either reducing, redefining or reprioritizing our goals to bring them in line with our limited resources. This pendulum swing is illustrative of the shift between our idealist and realist sides.

In the early years of the Cold War, our foreign policy goals focused on containing communism in Europe. We recognized that our resources were limited. We had been demobilizing since the end of World War II and the American public had reverted to its traditional isolationist character.

Containment was limited only to Western Europe where our military strength was greatest. This period clearly represented the pragmatic side of our character, although it is important to note that events during this time laid the ground- work for our missionary impulse to arise. These events include the fall of China to the communists, the red scare in the United States, and the development of the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union. By the middle of 1. National Security Council Document 6. Asia. The invasion of South Korea by the communist North led President Truman without Congressional approval to mobilize and place U.

S. Military aid was also extended both to the French in Indochina and to the Philippine government that was facing an internal rebellion by the Huks. The Seventh Fleet was ordered to prevent any Chinese attack on Taiwan. Defense spending nearly tripled that year. Containment was no longer limited to Western Europe. It now included East Asia. Thus, from 1. 95. Eisenhower our greatly expanded foreign policy goals required a massive build up of resources if we were to be successful.

This massive build- up of resources and political will would never be enough to achieve all these goals. China’s entrance into the Korean War on November 2. U. S. Eisenhower was elected with the promise to bring the war in Korea to a rapid and successful conclusion. By December of 1. Eisenhower had come to the conclusion that the United States should not be engaged in a conventional war on the Asian mainland. His cabinet was made up primarily of former businessmen who were staunch fiscal conservatives and believed in balanced budgets. At the same time, the former general and now President understood the need to balance our resources with our foreign policy commitments.

He was a realist and recognized the limits of our capabilities. He ushered in a pragmatic foreign policy by redefining and limiting the goals of containment. Realizing the costs of liberating North Korea, he negotiated a cease- fire agreement between the North and South at the thirty- eighth parallel on July 2. Eisenhower redirected support for the French efforts in Indochina and initially promised only economic aid to the Diem government in South Vietnam. He came to rely more upon the resources of other countries through alliances, such as the Baghdad Pact and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, to counter the communist threat.

Eisenhower failed to offer support for the Hungarian uprising clearly recognizing that the United States did not have the military resources to challenge the Soviet Union in its sphere of influence. He used low- cost CIA- engineered coups to achieve goals in Guatemala and Iran. He created the United States Information Agency in 1. American culture, film, music and theatre to counter the appeal of communism. Given his administration’s fiscal conservatism, Eisenhower actually reduced the size of the armed forces and developed the strategic doctrine of massive retaliation, which clearly represented, in one memorable phrase, . These events included mission creep in Vietnam, the launching in the U. S. S. R. The young Kennedy set the tone for a changed foreign policy in his inaugural address with his commitment .

Although the Cuban missile crisis clearly was a sobering experience for Kennedy, we will never know if this event would have led to a more pragmatic approach to American foreign policy. President Johnson’s lesson from that crisis was that by gradually escalating the threat and our resolve, our enemies would eventually yield to our goals and interests. At the beginning of 1. Collapse was unacceptable to Johnson. In August he received authority from the Congress through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to take . By the end of his term in office he had committed more than a half a million American soldiers to Vietnam. And sending 2. 2,0.

Dominican Republic in 1. Cuban style revolution in our backyard. Toward the end of the Johnson years, certain factors began to limit the nation’s ability to exercise power; these laid the groundwork for the rise of the pragmatic or realist foreign policies of Nixon and Ford.

The factors involved include the development of second strike nuclear capability by the Soviet Union, a growing U. S. By 1. 96. 8 Walter Lippman was once again pointing out the tremendous deficit between the nation’s resources and Johnson’s . An implied agreement over conduct and spheres of influence (the Helsinki Accords) permitted the United States to refocus, set new priorities, and limit its foreign policy objectives to the maintenance of a balance among the major powers of the world. Watergate, a Congress reasserting itself into the foreign policy processes, the first oil crisis, and the . Under President Carter, U. S. Initially this was evident in Carter’s emphasis on human rights. The rise of the right wing of the Republican Party led by Ronald Reagan, the second oil crisis brought on by the fall of the Shah of Iran coupled with the hostage crisis, the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan influenced President Carter to pull the SALT II Treaty from Senate consideration and to ask for a dramatic increase in defense spending, including strategic forces.

The so- called Carter Doctrine of 1. United States to the defense of open waterways in the Persian Gulf. A return to a missionary foreign policy was clearly evident under President Ronald Reagan. With references to the window of vulnerability and continual emphasis on the expansionist, evil empire of the Soviet Union, the Reagan Doctrine promised not only containment but also the rollback communism worldwide. It also led to a dramatic increase in defense spending and a renewed arms race with the Soviet Union. Central America and the Caribbean became the testing ground for his crusade. Yet, by Reagan’s second term, it was becoming evident that this policy could not be sustained.

With massive government deficits due to declining revenues and increased spending during his first term, the budget became a constraint on his activist foreign policy. Other factors, including substantive changes in the policies and governing principles of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, the stalemated civil wars in both El Salvador and Nicaragua despite tremendous aid from the United States, the Iran- Contra scandal, and the fact that Reagan and Gorbachev finally met one another and actually liked each other – all these led to yet another swing of the pendulum to a more pragmatic foreign policy. Reagan’s second term was marked by arms agreements with the Soviet Union and Congressional efforts to rein in his prolific spending habits. President George H. Bush, who learned his foreign policy under the d. He directed a foreign policy success in the Gulf by masterfully putting together the largest and most successful war coalition since the Second World War.